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Committees & Boards


Interim Committee

  • Formed by President Truman to draft essential postwar legislation and to advise him on all aspects of atomic energy.21.1
  • Members of the Interim Committee scientific panel included: J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Ernest O. Lawrence, and Arthur Compton.21.2
  • During one of these meetings while on a break for lunch, according to Arthur Compton, he asked Stimson whether it might be possible to arrange a nonmilitary demonstration of the atomic bomb in such a manner that the Japanese would see the futility of continuing the war.21.3
  • On June 12th 1945, seven scientists from the Chicago laboratory submitted a petition, named the Franck Report, to the secretary of war urging a demonstration before observers from many countries in an uninhabited area. The Franck Report was submitted, through channels, to the Interim Committee’s Scientific Panel.21.4
  • On June 16th 1945, the panel met in Oppenheimer’s office in Los Alamos to consider the report. They acknowledged it was a fair-minded and serious attempt to present all sides of a complex issue. But in the end, the panel reported “with heavy heart” to the Interim Committee that “we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.” The committee agreed with the conclusion of its Scientific Panel.21.4

Armstrong Committee

  • In 1946, the small group of Army Air Force officers at Kirtland field forms the Armstrong Committees goal is to develop training programs to teach Army Air Force personnel to handle nuclear weapons. Reports are written on strategic application of the bomb, and the organization and types of military units that should handle the new weapons.

Sandia Road Material Board

  • Originally called the Joint Board on Road Material (‘Road Material’ being a code name for stockpile material) it was established on its first meeting, at Sandia Base, on 16 March 1948. The original members were:
  • AEC, representing Z-Division of the University of California
    • L. J. Paddison (Chairman of the Board)
      • G. C. Hollowwa (Alternate)
    • Arthur Machen
      • W. F. Schaffer Jr. (Alternate)
    • F. H. Longyear
  • AFSWP
    • Commander J. T. Hayward, USN
      • Commander J. N. Shaffer, USN (Alternate)
  • Lt. Colonel A. C. Nauman, USN
  • Lt. Colonel Gilbert M. Dorland, USA
    • Major P. R. Ellis, USA (Alternate)
  • Meetings
    • (49) 1950 – 03 – 15

Sandia Research and Development Board

  • The joint Research and Development Board which was established, with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), at Sandia Base, in 1948. Dr. Marvin J. Kelley, consultant to the AEC, visited Sandia Base in 1949 and suggested several changes of personnel in the military membership of the Board, to make the Board more effective. These suggestions were adopted. At the end of the year the Board included five members from the Sandia Corporation, four from the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) (Sandia Base) and one from the Special Weapons Command, of the Air Force, or a total of ten members. Those who attended meetings almost invariably included also representatives from: The Lost Alamos Scientific Laboratory; the AFSWP Headquarters in Washington; the AEC offices in Washington; the Strategic Air Command; and the Air Materiel Command.15.1
    • 1949 – 12 – 211.1
    • 1949 – 07 – 062.1

Sandia Weapons Development Board

  • Superseded the Sandia Research and Development Board; a joint field organization of the AFSWP and the AEC (Established in 1948) on 24 April, 1950.3.1 This board acted as liaison with associated technical organizations and the armed services under the chairmanship of the Director of Development of Sandia Corporation. In 1951 the board became recognized as an authoritative body for agreements and recommendations on all major projects.4.1 With the Board being responsible for selecting the appropriate organization within the services or AEC for tasks based on technical competency, if this task is developmental in nature, it is the Boards job to integrate this effort into the appropriate agency.5.1
  • An early department of Sandia which reviewed, approved or disapproved, and authorized design release of U.S. nuclear warheads for production. Originally known as the Sandia Research and Development Board formed in January 1948, this group first met two months later. In May 1950, it became the Sandia Weapons Development Board, and, two years later, the Special Weapons Development Board. The April 1950 charter of the SWDB stated that its purpose was to evaluate and make recommendations regarding the ordnance aspects of atomic weapons development and the special facilities there of required for military use; July 1952 charter of the SWDB had as its main purpose the development and standardization of atomic weapons.6.1
  • Members of the SWDB eventually include representatives from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, FC/AFSWP, Sandia, and the University of California Radiation Laboratory (UCRL) at Livermore.6.1
    • 1948 – 03 – 027.1
    • (39) 1950 – 06 – 218.7
    • 1950 – 08 – 029.1
      • Was a joint meeting with the TX-5 Steering Committee9.1
    • (43)1950 – 08 – 1610.6
    • 1950 – 09 – 1310.8
    • 1950 – 10 – 168.7
      • Also claims that this was the 46th meeting
    • (45) 1950 – 10 – 1810.1, 8.7
    • (46) 1950 – 11 – 2010.3, 10.7
    • 1950 – 11 – 278.8
    • (47) 1950 – 12 – 202.1, 10.1
    • 1951 – 03 – 138.6
    • (50) 1951 – 04 – 1010.1
    • (52) 1951 – 06 – 277.2, 8.3
    • 1951 – 12 – 118.4, 8.5
    • (54) 1951 – 08 – 0810.4
    • (58) 1951 – 12 – 118.9
    • (59) 1952 – 01 – 166.1
    • (61) 1952 – 04 – 1610.5
    • 1954 – 04 – 2813.4

Button Coordination Committee

  • Originating from the creation of the Mk9 weapon, it was suggested that this particular project be placed under a  committee having representation from Army Ordnance, Los Alamos, Santa Fe Operations Office, and Sandia. This Committee would allocate responsibilities, define weapon characteristics, and generally administer the program. Later as the program matured, the Santa Fe Operations Office noted that the number and variety of weapons currently being developed necessitated the establishment of a uniform policy for assignment of responsibilities, resulting in the Button Coordination Committee being dissolved on October 23, 1950, being replaced by the TX-G or Gun Committee.
    • 1950 – 07 – 2116.1
    • 1950 – 08 – 1116.2

Special Weapons Development Board

  • Superseded the Sandia Weapons Development Board, effective May 14, 1952)
    • (81) 1954 – 03 – 311.2
    • 1954 – 06 – 3011.2
      • Reviews proposed ordnance characteristics for the TX-1511.2
    • (89) 1955 – 01 – 221.2

Guided Missile Committee

  • Part of the Sandia Weapons Development Board8.1
    • (1) 1950 – 10 – 168.1
    • 1950 – 11 – 278.2, 8.8

TX-5 Steering Committee

  • 1950 – 01 – 272.2
  • 1950 – 08 – 029.1
    • Was a joint meeting with the Sandia Weapons Development Board9.1

TX-N Committee

  • A joint committee of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and Sandia members, established to guide the development of implosion-type weapons
    • 1955 – 01 – 0611.2
      • Joint-meeting with the TX-Theta Committee to discuss possibility of providing a Mk15 warhead11.2

TX-Theta Committee

  • A committee established to guide the development of thermonuclear weapons13.6
    • 1953 – 10 – 2611.1
      • First meeting after the TX-Theta Committee is formed
    • 1954 – 01 – 1513.1
      • Assigned TX-21 nomenclature to weapon project13.1
    • 1954 – 03 – 2613.2
      • Discussed the weight of the TX-21 bomb13.2
    • 1954 – 04 – 23
      • Results of a wind-tunnel experiment for the TX-21 bomb are discussed. The tests had been made at a speed of Mach 0.93 on models with scale diameters of 48, 51, 52 and 54.44 inches. A quarter-caliber ogive nose had produced poor results. A hemispherical nose with a 0.4-caliber ogive nose had resulted in fair dynamic stability with no spoiler bands., and good stability with one bad located between Stations 77 and 103. Good pressure-sensing results had been secured, and more testing was scheduled.13.3
    • 1954 – 05 – 2113.4
    • 1954 – 06 – 0413.1
      • Proposes expedited schedule for TX-21 program13.1
    • 1954 – 07 – 2313.5
      • Discussed the results of the wind-tunnel testing at Langley Field13.5
    • 1955 – 01 – 0611.2
      • Joint-meeting with the TX-N Committee to discuss possibility of providing a Mk15 warhead11.2

Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)

  • Established in December 1966, provides a forum for NATO member nations to exchange information on nuclear forces and planning. Held at the ministerial level, the NPG is composed of the defense ministers of NATO nations that take part in the NATO Defense Planning Committee. The NPG serves as the formal Alliance consultative body on nuclear forces planning and employment and is the ultimate authority within NATO with regard to nuclear policy issues. NPG discussions cover a broad range of nuclear policy matters, including the safety, security, and survivability of nuclear weapons; communications and information systems; and deployment issues. The NPG also covers other issues of common concern such as nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation.
  • The role of the NPG is to review the Alliance nuclear policy in light of the everchanging security challenges of the international environment and to adapt it as necessary to address these challenges. It also provides a forum in which member countries can participate in the development of Alliance nuclear policy and in decisions on NATO nuclear posture, regardless of whether they host U.S. nuclear weapons. Decisions within the NPG are made by consensus. Thus, the policies agreed upon by the NPG represent the common position of all participating countries.
    • High Level Group (HLG). Acting as the senior advisory body to the NPG on nuclear policy and planning issues, as well as nuclear weapons safety, security, and survivability matters, the HLG is chaired by the United States and is composed of national policy makers and experts. The HLG meets approximately twice a year, or as necessary, to discuss aspects of NATO nuclear policy, planning, and force posture, and matters concerning the safety, security, and survivability of nuclear weapons. The HLG relies on the technical work of its subordinate body, the Joint Theater Surety Management Group (JTSMG), to maintain the highest standards in nuclear surety.
    • NATO institutions did not adapt well to the nuances of political give and take. Before the formation of the HLG, the United States had traditionally played a dominant role in the NPG in the development of Alliance nuclear policy. The United States initiated and directed procurement policy, while keeping the allies informed and consulting on deployment through the NPG. The HLG and SCG have facilitated a more prominent role for the Europeans on NATO nuclear issues.

Senior Level Weapons Protection Group (SLWPG)

  • Established in 1983 to accelerate and complete the progress of the Long Range Security Program. The SLWPG establishes nuclear surety policy and reports to the Ministers of Defense.20.1 The SLWPG was Superseded by the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) High Level Group (HLG).
    • 1985
      • Meeting at Sandia20.1
    • 1987
      • Meeting at Sandia20.1
    • 1989
      • Meeting at Sandia20.1
    • 1991
      • Meeting at Sandia20.1
    • 1993
      • Meeting at Sandia20.1

WS3 Working Group

  • Part of the Joint Theater Surety Management Group (JTSMG), concerned primarily with validating security standards for the WS3 and with the security of the operations associated with the weapons stored in it. In conjunction with the working group, Sandians have supported USEUCOM and the JTSMG in both computer modeling and actual force-on-force exercises (simulating and adversary attack against defending forces) on WS320.2

Special Consultative Group (SCG)

  • Established to deal with arms control implications of NATO nuclear policy.14.1

Tableleg Committee

  • Created late 1955 as a joint AEC-DoD study to pursue various delivery options for low-level supersonic aircraft12.1
  • The Committee suggested two possible delivery methods. First, an elaborate aircraft maneuver might provide escape times as it approached, a low-flying aircraft could pull-up and lob its bomb in an arc toward the target while the pilot looped the plane over and back toward safety. This maneuver would require considerable pilot fortitude in 1950s-vintage aircraft traveling at or above the speed of sound. Second, parachutes, rotochutes, or retro-rockets on a bomb might retard its decent to the ground, slowing it to prevent its destruction at impact, thereby allowing a timer to delay detonation.12.1
    • (4) 1956 – 04 – 26
      • Held at Headquarters Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, a proposed weapon was submitted for consideration by the TAABLELEG Committee. This was a simple laydown weapon having a single yield. At the same meeting, information became available for the first time which indicated the possibility of attaining ruggedized versions of a [REDACTED] warhead. This then allowed expansion of the original proposal to include warheads of higher yield for consideration as a tactical family of 18″ diameter and 1500-2000lbs weight.17.1

References

  1. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of the Mk6 Bomb (Including the TX/XW-13, Mk18, and TX-20) (RS 3434/4). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
    1. p.11 (PDF Page)
    2. p.55 (PDF Page)
  2. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of the Mk6 Bomb (Including the TX/XW-13, Mk18, and TX-20) (RS 3434/4). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
    1. p.10 (PDF Page)
  3. Defense Atomic Support Agency. (1959). First History of AFSWP 1947-1954; Volume 3, 1950: Chapter 3—Headquarters—Sections 1 & 2 (Vol. 3). https://ntrl.ntis.gov/NTRL/dashboard/searchResults/titleDetail/PB99143745.xhtml
    1. 75 (PDF Page)
  4. Sandia National Laboratories. (1951). President Landry Presents Annual Report to Directors. Sandia Bulletin. 3(10). https://archive.org/details/sandianewsletters
    1. p.1
  5. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of the Mk7 Warhead. Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
    1. p.49 (PDF Page)
  6. Hansen, C. (1995). Swords of Armageddon: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Histories—Gravity Bombs, Anti-Submarine Weapons, and Atomic Demolition Munitions (2nd Edition, Vol. 5). Chukelea Publications. http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62490342
    1. p.68 (PDF Page)
  7. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of the Mark 5 Bomb (RS 3434/2). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
    1. p.9 (PDF Page)
    2. p.25 (PDF Page)
  8. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of the Mk5 Warhead (RS 3434/3). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
    1. p.12 (PDF Page)
    2. p.13 (PDF Page)
    3. p.15 (PDF Page)
    4. p.17 (PDF Page)
    5. p.29 (PDF Page)
    6. p.40 (PDF Page)
    7. p.47
    8. p.48
    9. p.50
  9. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of the Mk7 Bomb (RS 3434/5). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
    1. p.4 (PDF Page)
  10. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of Gun-Type Bombs and Warheads Mks 8, 10, and 11 (RS 3434/7). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
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    2. p.7 (PDF Page)
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  11. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of the Early Thermonuclear Weapons Mks 14, 15, 16, 17, 24, and 29 (RS 3434/10). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
    1. p.8 (PDF Page)
    2. p.10 (PDF Page)
  12. Johnson, L. (1997). Sandia National Laboratory: A History of Exceptional Service in the National interest (No. SAND97-1029). http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2018/ph241/blair1/docs/sand-97-1029.pdf
    1. p.82 (PDF Page)
  13. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). Mks 21, 22, 26 and 36 (RS3434/11). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
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    2. p.6 (PDF Page)
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    4. p.8 (PDF Page)
    5. p.10 (PDF Page)
    6. p.44 (PDF Page)
  14. Wasserman, S. L. (1983). The Neutron Bomb Controversy: A Study in Alliance Politics. Praeger Publishers; CBS Educational and Professional Publishing. https://archive.org/details/neutronbombcontr00sher
    1. p.161 (PDF Page)
  15. Defense Atomic Support Agency. (1959). First History of AFSWP 1947-1954: Volume 2, 1949: Chapter 3—Headquarters (Vol. 2). https://ntrl.ntis.gov/NTRL/dashboard/searchResults/titleDetail/PB99143687.xhtml
    1. p.200 (PDF Page)
  16. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of Gun-Type Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles Mk9, 19, 23, 32, and 33 Shells (RS 3434/8; p. 39). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
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    2. p.10 (PDF Page)
  17. AFSWP Field Command Headquarters. (1956). Feasibility of a Tactical/Laydown Weapon Family (FC/08560003; p. 214). https://ntrl.ntis.gov/NTRL/dashboard/searchResults/titleDetail/PB99143810.xhtml
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  18. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of the Mk25 Warhead (Historical Report RS 3434/12; p. 38). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
    1. p.32 (PDF Page)
  19. Information Research Division 3434. (1967). History of the Mk30 Warhead (Historical Report RS 3434/15; p. 32). Los Alamos National Laboratory. https://osf.io/46sfd/
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  20. Sandia National Laboratories. (1995, June 23). Lab News—Vol 47, No 13. Sandia Lab News, 47(13), 12. https://archive.org/details/C1149_Lab_News_06-23-95
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  21. Thomas, G., & Witts, M. M. (1977). Enola Gay. Stein and Day. https://archive.org/details/enolagay0000thom_h7y7/mode/2up
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